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From Dean and Crown to the Tax Reform Act of
1984: Taxation of Interest-Free Loans
Michael D. Hartigan*
Until recently, taxpayers participating in interest-free loan
transactions' paid neither income 2 nor gift tax.3 In 1984, however,
the Supreme Court4 and Congress5 established both income and gift
tax consequences for interest-free loans.
While addressing the income tax6 and the gift tax7 consequences
separately, this article provides an historical background of the in-
come and gift tax treatments of interest-free loans.8 In addition, the
article discusses the current erosion of these historical tax treatments 9
and identifies the proper methods for income and gift taxation of
interest-free loans.10
* B.S.B.A., 1978, Stonehill College; J.D., 1981, University of Notre Dame; LL.M., 1983,
Boston University; Member, Massachusetts Bar.
1 This article focuses only on demand loans unless otherwise stated, and reviews income
and gift tax consequences of interest-free loans and of loans which carry a reduced rate of
interest (lower than market rate). The same reasoning applies equally to both interest-free
and reduced-rate loans.
2 Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d
11 (2d Cir. 1982); Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Com-
missioner, 664 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.
1981); Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
1083 (1961). The IRS has made many other unsuccessful attempts to overrule Dean, includ-
ing: Trowbridge v. Commissioner, 1981 TAx CT. MEM. Dac. (P-H) 1 81,190; Estate of Liech-
tung v. Commissioner, 40 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 1118 (1980); Lisle v. Commissioner,
1976 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 1 76,140.
3 Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. United States, 254
F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
4 Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (gift tax consequences), afd,
104 S. Ct. 1086, reh g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1932 (1984).
5 Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 172, 98 Stat. 494 (to be codified at
I.R.C. § 7872 (1984)).
6 See text accompanying notes 11-162 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 163-290 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 11-19 (income tax) and 163-95 (gift tax) infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 33-46 (income tax) and 196-229 (gift tax) infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 47-162 (income tax) and 230-90 (gift tax) infra.
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I. Income Tax Consequences
A. Ilislorical Perspective: Dean Doctine
During 1955 and 1956, J. Simpson and Paulina duPont Dean
had more than two million dollars of outstanding interest-free loans
from a corporation that they controlled."I The Internal Revenue
Service (the "IRS") asserted that the Deans derived an economic
benefit'2 equal to the current prime interest rate 13 from the free use
of the borrowed money. The IRS relied on cases holding that the
rent-free use of corporate property by a stockholder, director, officer,
or employee may result in the realization of income. 14 The IRS anal-
ogized an interest-free loan from a corporation to the rent-free use of
corporate property. Concluding that the Deans received an eco-
nomic benefit and thus realized income from the loan, the IRS deter-
mined deficiencies in income tax for 1955 and 1956.15
The United States Tax Court acknowledged that an interest-
free loan results in an economic benefit to the recipient. Neverthe-
less, the court rejected the IRS' analogy and distinguished the inter-
est-free use of corporate money from the rent-free use of corporate
property.' 6 The court reasoned that had the Deans borrowed the
money on interest-bearing notes, they could have fully deducted any
interest payments under section 163.17 If the Deans had rented cor-
porate property, however, instead of using it rent-free, they could not
have deducted the rental payments.' 8 Accordingly, the Tax Court
held that an "interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the bor-
11 Dean, 35 T.C. at 1088.
12 Id. at 1087.
13 Id.
14 Id at 1089. The Tax Court listed nine prior cases which all generally held that the
rent-free use of corporate property may result in the realization of income. Dean v. Commis-
sioner, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951), afjg, Paulina duPont Dean, 9 T.C. 256 (1947) (rent-free
use of corporation's house); Chester Distributing Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.
1950) (personal entertainment expenses paid by corporation); Alex Silverman, 28 T.C. 1061,
a fd, 253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958) (wife's travel expenses paid by corporation); Louis Green-
spon, 23 T.C. 138 (1954), rev'd on other grounds, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) (farm expenses
paid by corporation); Rodgers Dairy Co., 14 T.C. 66 (1950) (personal use of corporation's
automobile); Percey M. Chandler, 41 B.T.A. 165 (1940), a fd, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941)
(rent-free use of corporation's apartment and lodge); Reynard Corporation, 30 B.T.A. 451
(1934) (rent-free use of corporation's house); Charles A. Frueauff, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934) (rent-
free use of corporation's apartment).
15 35 T.C. at 1083.
16 Id at 1090.
17 Id.; I.R.C. § 163(a) (1984) (generally, deduction allowed for "all interest paid or ac-
crued within the taxable year on indebtedness").
18 35 T.C. at 1090.
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rower" because any economic benefits received would have been off-
set by an interest deduction.19
B. Post-Dean Anaysis: Commissioner Estopped By Own Laches
If the IRS had appealed Dean or pursued its position in a
promptly issued nonacquiescence, the courts probably would have
modified or overruled the Dean doctrine. 20 But, the IRS withdrew its
appeal of Dean and waited twelve years to announce its
nonacquiescence.
2t
Before the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, seven cir-
cuits had accepted the Dean doctrine.22 In Greenspun v. Commisioner,23
Howard Hughes loaned four million dollars to Herman Greenspun, a
Las Vegas newspaper publisher. In exchange for Greenspun's prom-
ise to promote Hughes' proposed purchase of several Las Vegas casi-
nos, Hughes charged Greenspun a reduced rate of interest. 24 The
IRS contended that Greenspun realized gross income of the differ-
ence between the loan's reduced interest rate and the prime interest
rate.25 Furthermore, the IRS also claimed that Greenspun could not
deduct under section 16326 interest neither paid nor accrued. 2
7
In Greenspun, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subtly
reprimanded the IRS for not pursuing its position in Dean. The court
of appeals implied that it might have overturned or modified the
Dean doctrine had the IRS immediately challenged the decision. 28
Yet, because the IRS had not effectively attacked the Dean doctrine,
the court acknowledged the doctrine as the controlling law.29 More-
over, since taxpayers had relied on Dean for two decades, the court
19 Id.
20 Greenspun, 670 F.2d at 125; Beaton, 664 F.2d at 317; Martin, 649 F.2d at 1133. Stating
that since the IRS had not challenged Dean within a reasonable time, the courts would not
disturb the doctrine because the IRS' inaction caused taxpayers to rely on Dean.
21 1973-2 C.B. 4 (1973).
22 Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d
11 (2d Cir. 1982); Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Com-
missioner, 644 F.2d 316 (Ist Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.
1981); Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Hardee v. United States,
82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9459 (1982), reo'd, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
23 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982).
24 Id. at 124.
25 Id
26 I.R.C. § 163(a) (1984). For the general language of § 163(a), see note 17 supra.
27 670 F.2d at 125.
28 The court said that although it appreciated the IRS' argument, Dean had been con-
trolling law for two decades and had to be followed. Id. The court implied that had Dean not
been a longstanding doctrine, it might have modified or overruled it.
29 Id.
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believed that overruling or modifying Dean would cause uncertainty
and an uneven application of the income tax statute.30 The court
reasoned:
Too much water has passed under the bridge to warrant judicial
re-examination of the principles underlying the [Dean] decision or
the problems generated by it. Where, as here, the Government
seeks to modify a principle of taxation so firmly entrenched in
our jurisprudence, it should turn to Congress, not to the courts.
31
Therefore, the court applied the Dean doctrine and held that Green-
spun did not realize gross income from the reduced interest rate
loan.
3 2
C. Recent Analsis." Hardee v. United States
1. Trial Court Decision
Twenty-one years after Dean, the IRS convinced the United
States Court of Claims that the case's reasoning and result were in-
correct. In Hardee v. United States,33 the Court of Claims identified
two fundamental problems with the Dean doctrine. First, section 163,
the controlling statute, provides only a deduction for interest "paid
or accrued within the taxable year."'34 The borrower of an interest-
free loan, however, neither pays nor accrues interest. Thus, the
"wash-out" theory35 has no statutory basis.
Furthermore, in Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating,36 the
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he propriety of a deduction does not
30 Id. at 125-26.
31 Id The court continued:
As noted by the Supreme Court . ..: "Courts properly have been reluctant to
depart from an interpretation of tax law which has been generally accepted when
the departure could have potentially far-reaching consequences. When a principle
of taxation requires re-examination, Congress is better equipped than a court to
define precisely the type of conduct which results in tax consequences. When courts
readily undertake such tasks, taxpayers may not rely with assurance on what appear
to be established rules lest they be subsequently overturned. Legislative enactment,
on the other hand, although not always free from ambiguity, at least afford the
taxpayers advance warning."
Id. at 126 (quoting United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1971)).
32 Id
33 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459 (1982). A corporation controlled by Mr. and Mrs.
Hardee loaned Mr. Hardee approximately one-half million dollars on an interest-free basis.
See id. at 9459, at 84,656.
34 I.R.C. § 163(a) (1984). For the general language of § 163(a), see note 17 supra.
35 The Dean doctrine also is referred to as the "wash-out" theory because any economic
benefits from the interest-free loan allegedly are "washed out" by a corresponding interest
deduction.
36 417 U.S. 134 (1974).
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turn upon general equitable considerations, such as a demonstration
of effective economic and practical equivalence. Rather, it 'depends
upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor
can any particular deduction be allowed.' -a3 The Hardee trial court
found that Hardee did not pay or accrue any interest and that no
specific statutory provision allows a deduction for interest neither
paid nor accrued. Thus, relying on a literal interpretation of section
163, the court would not allow an interest deduction for an interest-
free loan.
38
Second, the Hardee trial court objected to the result of the Dean
doctrine.3 9 The doctrine's purpose is to afford the same tax treat-
ments to transactions functionally identical yet differing in form.
40
The court observed that while the Dean doctrine eliminated one une-
qual tax imposition it created another imbalance. Under Dean, the
interest-free loan recipient avoided any adverse economic conse-
quences by incurring neither finance charges nor taxes.4' The court
concluded that the result of applying the Dean doctrine seemed "even
more out-of-joint, economically speaking, than the discrepancy it
means to overcome .... ,,42
Because of these two fundamental problems, the Hardee court
chose not to follow the Dean doctrine. Instead, the court noted that
section 6143 has been broadly construed to effectuate the congres-
sional purpose to "tax all gains except those specifically exempted.
'44
The interest-free use of corporate funds gives rise to an economic
benefit 45 not specifically exempted from taxation. Accordingly, the
court held that Hardee realized income from the interest-free use of
corporate funds and was not entitled to an interest deduction.46
37 Id. at 148-49 (quoting New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934)).
38 Hardee, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,659; I.R.C. § 163(a) (1984). For the
language of § 163(a), see note 17 supra.
39 Hardee, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9459, at 84,659.
40 Id. The interest-free loan transaction is considered to be identical to a transaction in
which the borrower receives the payment of compensation or other payment from the lender,
and then the borrower makes an interest payment of the same amount to the lender.
41 Id
42 Id.
43 I.R.C. § 61(a) (1984) (gross income includes "all income from whatever source
derived").
44 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955).
45 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980); Martin v. Commissioner,
649 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The interest-free transfer of
the use of money gives the borrower an opportunity to make additional income at no cost.
Clearly, the borrower receives an economic benefit from the transfer.
46 Hardee, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9459, at 84,659.
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2. Court of Appeals Decision
Citing the Dean doctrine as controlling law, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision and held that the receipt of interest-free loans did not result
in taxable gain to the borrower.47 The Hardee appeals court followed
both the reasoning and result of the six appellate court decisions48
rejecting the income taxation of interest-free loans, but additionally
excluded the loan's benefit from taxable income at the outset. Essen-
tially, the Hardee appeals court found that since the Dean doctrine
was a "well-entrenched principle of tax law" 49 accepted by six courts
of appeals, "[t]o depart from the long-standing precedent against
treating such loans as a taxable benefit would create uncertainty and
would result in an uneven application of the tax law." 50
In addition, the Hardee appeals court declared that "the defini-
tion of taxable income does not encompass the benefit a [borrower]
. . .gains by the receipt of an interest-free loan."'51 Thus, the court
of appeals accepted the Dean "wash-out" theory, but also expanded
the doctrine by concluding that the benefit of interest-free loans fell
outside the scope of section 61.52
D. Tax Reform Act of 1984." Caveat Creditor et Debtor
Section 17253 of the 1984 Tax Reform Act amended the Internal
Revenue Code by adding section 787254 entitled "Treatment of
Loans With Below-Market Interest Rates." Section 7872 establishes
both income and gift tax consequences for certain interest-free loan
transactions and generally applies to interest-free loans made or out-
standing after June 6, 1984.55
47 Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661, 667-68 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
48 Id. at 662; Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Commis-
sioner, 677 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1982); Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982);
Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 316 (lst Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d
1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Suttle v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980). The court in
Hardee followed these prior cases, except for its extension of the Dean doctrine, which is dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 51-52 infra.
49 708 F.2d at 662.
50 Id. at 668.
51 Id at 665.
52 Id. at 665; at 669 (Kashiwa, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of the expansion of
the Dean doctrine, see notes 129-34 inflra and accompanying text. For the language of I.R.C.
§ 6 1(a), see note 43 supra.
53 Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-639, § 172, 98 Stat. 494 (to be codified at
I.R.C. § 7872).
54 Id
55 Section 7872 does not apply to any demand loan outstanding on June 6, 1984, if such
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Section 7872 applies to both term and demand loans that are
"below-market loans."'56 A demand loan is a below-market loan "if
. . . interest is payable on the loan at a rate less than the applicable
Federal rate. . . . 57A term loan is a below-market loan "if. . . the
amount loaned exceeds the present value of all payments due under
the loan."
581
Section 7872 applies to any demand or term below-market loan
that is: (1) a gift loan; (2) a corporation-shareholder loan; (3) a com-
pensation-related loan between an employer and employee or be-
tween an independent contractor and a person for whom the
independent contractor provides services; (4) a loan that has tax
avoidance as one of its principal purposes; or (5) any other loan that
the IRS determines by regulations has a significant effect on the fed-
eral tax liability of either the borrower or the lender.59
The tax treatment under section 7872 depends upon the type of
below-market loan.60 Gift loans6' and demand loans62 incur different
income tax consequences than do term loans.63 The foregone inter-
est64 from a gift or a demand loan is "treated as. .. transferred from
the lender to the borrower, [as a gift, compensation, a dividend, a
demand loan is repaid within 60 days after the date of enactment. The date of enactment
was July 18, 1984; thus, the demand loans must have been repaid before Sept. 17, 1984 to be
outside the scope of § 7872.
56 I.R.C. § 7872(e)(1) (1984) defines the term "below-market loan." See text accompany-
ing notes 57-58 inra.
57 Id.; I.R.C. § 7872(0(5) (1984) provides that a "demand loan" means "any loan which
is payable in full at any time on the demand of the lender. . . [or] any loan which is not
transferable and the benefits of the interest arrangements of which is conditioned on the
future performance of substantial services by an individual." Section 7872(0(2)(b) provides
that the federal short-term rate in effect under I.R.C. § 1274(d) (1984) is to be used to deter-
mine foregone interest calculated under § 7872(e)(2). For a detailed explanation of the appli-
cable federal rate under § 1274, see note 66 inra. A non-transferable below-market term loan
where the benefits of the interest arrangement are conditioned on future performance of sub-
stantial services by an individual is converted under § 7872(0(5) to a demand loan for pur-
poses of § 7872.
58 Id; 26 I.R.C. § 7872(l)(6) (1984) defines "term loan" to mean "any loan which is not a
demand loan."
59 I.R.C. § 7872(c) (1984) lists the five types of loans that come within its scope. The
type of the loan involved determines certain other tax consequences. For example, the initial
imputed transfer between the lender and the borrower may be a gift subject to gift tax, or a
payment of wages includable in the borrower's taxable income. See text accompanying notes
60-93.
60 Id
61 I.R.C. § 7872()(3) (1984) defines "gift loan" to mean "any below-market loan where
the foregoing of interest is in the nature of a gift."
62 "Demand loan" is defined at note 57 supra.
63 "Term loan" is defined at note 58 supra.
64 I.R.G. § 7872(e)(2) (1984) defines the term "foregone interest" to mean:
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capital contribution, or other payment] . . . and retransferred by the
borrower to the lender as interest [income]." '65 Thus, the lender is
deemed to have made a loan at an imputed "applicable Federal
rate, '66 and the borrower is deemed to have paid the lender imputed
interest. The imputed interest is calculated daily and considered
transferred and retransferred on the last day of the calendar year.
67
The lender must include the imputed interest in his gross income.
68
The borrower is entitled to an interest deduction under section 163 as
if he had actually made the interest payments. 69
the excess of
(A) the amount of interest which would have been payable on the loan for the
period if interest accrued on the loan at the applicable Federal rate and were pay-
able annually on the . . . [last day of the calendar year] . . . , over
(B) any interest payable on the loan properly allocable to such period.
65 I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1) (1984). See the example at note 67 infta.
66 I.R.C. § 7872(f)(2)(A) and (B) define the applicable federal rate to be used to calculate
imputed interest for term and demand loans. The imputed interest rate for demand loans is
the federal short-term rate under I.R.C. § 1274(d) (1984). For term loans, the applicable
federal rate that a lender and a borrower must use is determined by reference to the term of
the loan in accordance with § 1274(d) the following rates apply as of the date the loan was
made:
Term of Loan Interest Rate
Not more than three years Federal short-term rate
More than three years Federal mid-term rate
but less than ten years
More than nine years Federal long-term rate
From June 7, 1984 until Jan. 1, 1985, the applicable federal rate is ten (10%) percent, com-
pounded semiannually. In a news release dated Nov. 11, 1984, the IRS announced the rates
that will apply beginning Jan. 1, 1985 IR-84-115. Thereafter, the applicable federal rate is
set for the six-month periods beginning Jan. 1 and July 1 of each year, and is based on the
average market yield on outstanding marketable securities of the United States with compa-
rable maturities for the six-month periods ending on the preceeding Sept. 30 and March 31,
respectively.
67 I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2) (1984). A demand loan is considered a series of one day term loans
with foregone interest calculated on a daily basis using the federal short-term rate.
68 I.R.C. §§ 7872(a) and (b) (1984). For example, on July 1, 1984, a corporation loans its
employee $250,000 on a demand basis at a rate of five (5%) percent per annum. For 1984,
foregone interest considered to be transferred and retransferred between the parties is approx-
imately $6284 ($250,000 x 10% x 184/366 over $250,000 X 5% X 184/366). The corporation
may deduct the $6284 as compensation paid, subject to reasonable compensation rules, but it
must include the same amount in income as imputed interest. The employee must include
the $6284 in taxable income as wages and may be entitled to an interest deduction under
§ 163 for the same amount. The employee is considered to have paid the imputed $6284
along with the actual interest paid under the terms of the loan.
For demand loans and gift loans, although the amounts deemed transferred and retrans-
ferred are not subject to withholding under Chapter 24 of the Internal Revenue Code, the
conference agreement states that the imputed interest, in a compensation-related loan, is
treated as wages for purpose of Chapters 21 (F.I.C.A.), 22 (R.R.T.A.), and 23 (F.U.T.A.).
69 The borrower is entitled to an interest deduction on a below-market loan so long as
such deduction would be allowed had the borrower actually paid the interest thereon. No
[Vol. 60:31
INTEREST-FREE LOANS
With non-gift term loans, the lender is treated as transferring
and the borrower is treated as receiving "cash in an amount equal to
the excess of the amount loaned, over the present value of all pay-
ments which are required to be made under the terms of the loan.
'70
The imputed excess is deemed transferred and received on the date
the loan is made or on the first day section 7872 applies, whichever is
later. 71 In addition, the lender receives interest income and the bor-
rower pays interest of the daily total of the imputed original issue
discount for every day the loan is outstanding during the tax year.
72
If the borrower receives a term loan that is also a corporation-
shareholder loan or a compensation-related loan, the borrower recog-
nizes income of all of the imputed excess on the date the loan is
made.73 Thus, if a corporation makes a below-market term loan to a
shareholder, on the loan date the shareholder receives a dividend of
the imputed excess. The corporation is not entitled to a deduction.
However, with a corporate loan to an employee, on the loan date the
imputed excess constitutes ordinary income to the borrower. The
lender is allowed a deduction for a compensation expense. During
the life of the loan, however, in both situations the lender receives
and the borrower deducts the imputed interest because the imputed
excess is deemed to be original issue discount.74
Section 7872 treats a below-market gift term loan as a demand
loan for income tax purposes and as a term loan for gift tax pur-
interest deduction is permitted if the borrower does not itemize his deductions. Similarly, no
interest deduction would be allowed in excess of the limitation on interest on investment
indebtedness under § 163(d), or where the borrower used the loan proceeds to purchase or
carry tax-exempt income instruments under § 265.
The Treasury Department is authorized to promulgate regulations to assure that the tax
positions of the borrower and the lender are consistent. I.R.C. § 7872(g)(1)(B) (1984). The
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference provides that the regulations
may condition the § 163 deduction for deemed interest under § 7872 on adequate identifica-
tion of the lender (i.e., lender's name, address, and taxpayer identification number).
130 CONG. REC. H6649 (1984).
70 I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1) (1984).
71 Id.
72 Id. at § (b)(1) and (2). For an explanation of the treatment of original issue discount
under § 1272, see note 87 inf/a. For rules to determine the amount of original issue discount,
see I.R.C. § 1273 (1984).
73 Id.
74 Id. The borrower encounters a special tax problem in that the borrower is required to
recognize the original issue discount amount up-front as taxable income. However, the bor-
rower cannot deduct the same amount in the same tax year. The borrower is entitled to
deduct the imputed interest excess of § 7872(b) over the life of the loan. Thus, a timing
imbalance occurs in that the recognition of income and allowance of a corresponding deduc-
tion may occur in different tax years.
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poses. 75 For gift tax purposes, on the later of the loan date or the
date section 7872 applies, the lender is deemed to give the borrower
the excess of the amount loaned over the present value of all princi-
pal and interest payments required under the loan.76 For income tax
purposes, the foregone interest, imputed on the last day of the calen-
dar year, is considered to be retransferred from the borrower to the
lender. 7
7
Section 7872 contains essentially three exceptions to the imposi-
tion of income tax on an interest-free loan.78 First, the section pro-
vides a $10,000 de minimis exception. 79 Gift loans between
individuals are not subject to section 7872 for any day on which the
total amount of loans between the parties does not exceed $10,000, if
the loan proceeds are not used to purchase or carry income-produc-
ing assets.80 In addition, section 7872 does not apply to compensa-
tion-related loans or to corporation-shareholder loans for any day on
which the total amount of loans between the parties does not exceed
$10,000, unless the principal purpose of the loans is federal tax avoid-
ance.8 The conference agreement indicates that all loans between
the lender and borrower are included in ascertaining if the total
amount exceeds the $10,000 limitation.8 2 Moreover, if the taxpayer
is married, loans to the taxpayer's spouse are also included in com-
75 I.R.C. § 7872(d)(2) (1984). The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference provides the following example:
[Alssume that on January 1, P, a calendar year taxpayer, makes a $200,000 loan to
S, [also] a calendar year taxpayer, for two years at 5 percent simple interest payable
annually. If the applicable Federal rate is 12 percent compounded semiannually,
the amount treated as transferred by the lender to the borrower for gift tax purposes
would be $27,760 (i.e., the excess of $200,000 over the present value of all payment
due under the loan discounted at the applicable Federal rate). The amount treated
as retransferred by the borrower to the lender on the last day of each of the two
calendar years would be $14,720 (i.e., the excess of interest computed at the applica-
ble Federal rate (compounded semiannually) over the interest actually payable on
the loan). This amount, which would be included in income by the lender and,
subject to the rules governing the deductibility of interest, deductible by the bor-
rower, would be in addition to the $10,000 actually due each year under the terms
of the loan.
130 CONG. REC. H6648 (1984).
76 Id.
77 Id
78 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2) and (3) ($10,000 de minimis exception), (d) ($100,000 gift loan
exception), and (g)(1)(C) (1984) (IRS-sanctioned exceptions by regulations).
79 Id. at § (c)(2) and (3).
80 Id. at § (c)(2)(A) and (B).
81 Id. at § (c)(3)(A) and (B).
82 130 CoNG. REC. H6647 (1984). This aggregation rule is designed to prevent structur-
ing a series of small loans between the same parties to come within the de minimis exception.
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puting the $10,000 limitation.83 If section 7872 applies to a non-gift
term loan on any day, then the de minimis exception does not pre-
vent the imposition of income tax. Thus, section 7872 would apply
to a non-gift term loan even if the outstanding balance fell below
$10,000.84
The second exception deals with gift loans of $100,000 or less.
The imputed interest income under section 7872 is limited to the bor-
rower's net investment income if the gift loan is between individuals
and the outstanding balance for any day does not exceed $100,000.85
The borrower's net investment income is deemed to be zero and no
interest income is imputed if the borrower's net investment income
for the year does not exceed $1,000.86 Section 7872's definition of net
investment income incorporates the definition provided in section
163(d). Additionally, net investment income includes any income
recognized under the original discount provision of section 127287 as
if that provision applied to all deferred payment obligations, includ-
ing those exempted in section 1272. Thus, section 7872 specifies that
those deferred payment obligations include U.S. savings bonds, mar-
ket discount bonds, annuities, short-term obligations and other simi-
lar obligations.88 All loans between the parties are counted toward
the $100,000 limitation.89 In addition, if more than one gift loan is
outstanding, the borrower's net investment income is allocated
among the outstanding gift loans in proportion to the amounts that
would be considered as retransferred by the borrower notwithstand-
ing this exception. 90 This exception does not apply to loans made
with the principal purpose of tax avoidance. 91
The third exception under section 7872 gives the IRS authority
83 I.R.C. § 7872(0(7) (1984) treats a husband and wife as one person.
84 Id. at § 7872(0(10).
85 Id. at § (d)(1)(A).
86 Id. at § (d)(1)(E)(ii).
87 Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1272, 98 Stat. 494 (to be codified at
I.R.C. § 1272 (1984)). Section 1272 is entitled: "Current Inclusion in Income of Original
Issue Discount." Section 1272 requires the holder of an original issue discounted instrument
to include the accrued portion of the discount in his gross income. Yet, § 1272 exempts cer-
tain instruments, such as United States savings bonds, short-term obligations, and other simi-
lar obligations.
However, I.R.C. § 7872 (1984) does not adopt the exemptions in § 1272. Hence, the
accrued discount of such obligations and other such instruments covered by § 1272 must be
included in investment income under § 7872.
88 I.R.C. § 7872(d)(l)(E)(i), (iii), and (iv) (1984).
89 See note 82 sup-a.
90 I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(C) (1984).
91 Id.at § (d)(1)(B).
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to promulgate regulations exempting certain transactions if the be-
low-market interest arrangement does not significantly affect the fed-
eral tax liability of either party.92 Unless one of these three
exceptions is satisfied, a below-market loan gives rise to income tax
consequences.
93
E. Suggested Analysis.- Income Taxation of Interest-Free Loans
Five analyses of the taxation of interest-free loans have been pro-
posed: (1) the IRS' "income/no deduction" analysis; 94 (2) the "no
income/no deduction" analysis adopted by Dean;95 (3) the "modified
no income/no deduction" analysis suggested by legal scholars;96 (4)
the "income exemption" analysis of Hardee,97 and (5) the "two-pay-
ment transaction" analysis first outlined in the dissent to Martin v.
Commzssioner 98 and now codified in section 7872 of the Tax Reform
Act.99 This section of the article critiques the first four analyses and
argues that the fifth analysis provides the correct approach to the
income taxation of interest-free loans.
1. "Income/No Deduction" Analysis
The "income/no deduction" analysis proposed by the IRS inter-
prets and applies sections 61 and 163 literally to impose income tax
on the recipient of an interest-free loan. 00 The IRS asserts that sec-
tion 61 describes gross income broadly and that the courts should
construe the term literally to effectuate Congress' intent to tax in-
come comprehensively. 0 1 As support, the IRS cites Commissioner v.
92 Id. at § (g)(1)(C). In addition, § 787 2(g) provides that the IRS shall prescribe neces-
sary and appropriate regulations to carry out the purposes of § 7872, including, but not lim-
ited to:
(A) regulations providing that where, by reason of varying rates of interest, condi-
tional interest payments, waivers of interest, disposition of the lender's or borrower's
interest in the loan, or other circumstances, the provisions of this section do not
carry out the purposes of this section, adjustments to the provisions of this section
will be made to the extent necessary to carry out the purposes of this section ...
93 I.R.C. § 7872 (1984).
94 Hardee v. United States, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9459, at 84,659.
95 Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
96 See, e.g., Sneed, Unlabeled Income and Section 483, 1965 S. CAL. TAx INST. 643.
97 Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
98 649 F.2d 1133, 1134-45 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
99 I.R.C. § 7872 (1984).
100 I.R.C. § 61(a) (1984) (gross income includes "all income from whatever source de-
rived") and § I.R.C. 163(a) (1984) (a deduction is allowed for "all interest paid or accrued
within the taxable year on indebtedness"); Hardee, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 9459, at
84,657-59; cf. cases cited at note 2 supra.
101 Hardee, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,658.
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Glenshaw Glass'02 where the Supreme Court, discussing section 61's
predecessor, 10 3 commented:
This court has frequently stated that this language [in section
22(a)] was used by Congress to exert in this field "the full mea-
sure of its taxing power." Congress applied no limitations as to
the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their na-
ture. And the Court has given a literal construction to this broad
phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all
gains except those specifically exempted. 0 4
In addition, the IRS' argument depends upon cases upholding in-
come taxation for the rent-free use of corporate assets. 05 The IRS
contends that interest-free loans similarly confer a financial benefit
upon the recipient who therefore must include the value of that ben-
efit in gross income.1
0 6
Having established that the borrower realized income from the
free use of the loan money, the IRS also contests the deductibility of
interest that the borrower neither paid nor accrued.10 7 On the de-
ductibility issue, the IRS again reads section 163 literally and con-
cludes that the interest-free loan recipient has neither paid nor
accrued interest as required for a deduction. 0 8 Thus, under the IRS'
interpretation, no interest deduction would be available to offset the
borrower's realized income.
The IRS' position is inconsistent. In seeking to tax the economic
benefit of an interest-free loan, the IRS argues that the "substance of
the thing done and not the form it took"'1 9 should govern the loan's
tax treatment. Yet, the IRS' denial of an interest deduction would
exalt the form of the transaction over the substance."'° In essence,
the IRS would apply the "substance over form" doctrine to the in-
come aspects of interest-free loans, but would reject the doctrine's
application to the interest deduction."'
102 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
103 I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939) is the predecessor to I.R.C. § 61 (1984). The language of§ 22(a)
is similar to that of § 61(a).
104 Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429-30.
105 See note 14 supra.
106 Hardee, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CH-) 9459, at 84,656-57.
107 Id. at 9459, at 84,657.
108 Id.; I.R.C. § 163(a) (1984) allows a deduction for "all interest paid or accrued within
the taxable year on indebtedness."
109 Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 661 (1939).
110 Martin, 648 F.2d at 1137 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
111 Id
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In his dissenting opinion in Martin v. Commissioner,'12 Circuit
Judge Goldberg observed that the IRS interprets the income and de-
duction provisions independently and literally to ignore the eco-
nomic reality of an interest-free loan transaction. Judge Goldberg
concluded not only that the IRS' position created a gross injustice
but also that such an "illogical and unjust result is neither required
by nor even permitted under a fair and proper application of the
Internal Revenue Code."1 13
2. "No Income/No Deduction" Analysis
In Dean v. Commissioner,'14 the Tax Court adopted the "no in-
come/no deduction" analysis. The Dean doctrine established that
the borrower of an interest-free loan does not realize a taxable gain
because any economic benefit received would be offset by an interest
deduction. 
115
Yet, the Dean doctrine has three basic flaws: (1) the underlying
assumption of an available interest deduction; (2) the conclusion that
the borrower need not include in gross income the economic benefit
from the interest-free loan; and (3) the timing problems inherent in
the inclusion and deduction provisions left unaddressed in Dean.
These three weaknesses have been the basis of the attack on the Dean
doctrine since it was announced.
First, both the concurring and dissenting opinions'1 6 in Dean
sharply criticized the majority's holding that a borrower does not re-
alize any taxable gain from an interest-free loan. Underlying the
majority's holding was the generalization that a borrower always
would be allowed to take an interest deduction." 7 This assumption
ignores the Internal Revenue Code provisions specifically disallowing
an interest deduction." 8 Thus, the Dean majority's generalization
112 Id.
113 Id. The "income/no deduction" analysis was employed in Hardee v. United States,
82-2 U.S. Tax Gas. (CCIH) 9459 (1982), rev'd, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The lower
court's holding in Hardee is wrong because it rests on faulty reasoning.
114 Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
115 Id. at 1090. For a more detailed description of the Dean doctrine, see notes 11-19 supra
and accompanying text.
116 Id at 1090 (Opper, J., concurring); id. at 1091 (Bruce, J., dissenting).
117 Id
118 See I.R.C. § 265(a) (1984) (disallowance of interest paid for tax-exempt investments);
I.R.C. § 63 (1984) (no interest deduction if taxpayer does not itemize his deductions); I.R.C.
§ 264 (1984) (life insurance premium debt interest disallowed); I.R.C. § 163(d)(1) (1984) (in-
vestment interest limitations); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 362-70 (1960) (no in-
terest deduction in sham transactions).
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about the availability of an interest deduction creates a potential
injustice.
Second, since a "wash-out" occurred, the Tax Court in Dean de-
termined that the borrower need not include the alleged economic
benefit in gross income. 119 This determination creates both concep-
tual and practical problems. Focusing on the income aspects of in-
terest-free loans, the theoretical rationale for including the value of
rent-free use of corporate property in gross income 120 also applies to
interest-free loans.121 Moreover, as a practical matter, the determi-
nation not to include the economic benefits from an interest-free loan
may result in overstating or understating any deductions calculated
using the adjusted gross income.
122
Finally, the "no income/no deduction" analysis disregards the
timing method established in the inclusion 123 and deduction 124 provi-
sions. Generally, with an interest-free loan, the tax year in which a
taxpayer would include the economic benefits would not coincide
with the tax year in which a taxpayer may be allowed an interest
deduction for constructive interest paid. 125 But, the Dean doctrine
violates these fundamental timing principles by assuming that the
recipient could include the economic benefit in gross income and de-
duct the constructive interest in the same tax year.
3. "Modified No Income/No Deduction" Analysis
Attempting to correct the Dean doctrine's flaws, commentators
119 Dean, 35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J., concurring).
120 See note 14 supra.
121 See note 119 supra, see also text accompanying notes 14-19 supra. A borrower receives an
economic benefit from an interest-free loan, similar to the economic benefit transferred by the
rent-free use of property. Such a benefit could be included in gross income. However, the
Dean doctrine does not place its focus on these similar income aspects, but instead focuses on
the dissimilar deduction aspects. See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
122 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 63, 165, 170, 213 (1984). Section 63 defines "taxable income" as
adjusted gross income increased and decreased by certain items. The deductions permitted
under § 165 (casualty losses), § 170 (charitable contributions), and § 213 (medical expenses),
vary according to the taxpayer's amount of adjusted gross income. For example, § 170 per-
mits a deduction of certain charitable contributions up to 50% of adjusted gross income. If
the taxpayer had an interest-free loan and had made charitable contributions in excess of the
50% limitation, the taxpayer's § 170 deduction would be understated because, if the economic
benefits of the loans were included in income, the taxpayer's adjusted gross income would
have been higher and the 50% limitation figure would have been larger. Thus, a larger chari-
table deduction would have been allowed.
123 I.R.C. §§ 451-458 (1984). These sections govern the timing of recognition of items of
income.
124 I.R.C. §§ 461-466 (1984). These sections govern the timing of allowable deductions.
125 See notes 123-24 sura.
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suggested the "modified no income/no deduction" analysis. 126 Pro-
ponents of this analysis reject the Dean doctrine's assumption of the
availability of an interest deduction. Therefore, this modified analy-
sis proposes that before asserting the Dean doctrine, the taxpayer
must plead and prove that an interest deduction would have been
available had he actually paid interest. 127 This modification of the
Dean doctrine, however, eliminates only one of the doctrine's three
flaws.128 Accordingly, the "modified no income/no deduction" anal-
ysis does not correctly characterize the income tax consequences of
interest-free loans.
4. "Income Exemption" Analysis
In Hardee v. United States,'29 the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit held that "the definition of taxable income does not encom-
pass the benefit of such an interest-free loan in the first place" 13 and
thus expanded the Dean doctrine. The court reasoned that the Dean
doctrine did not depend on the availability of an interest deduction
because an interest-free loan does not give rise to any taxable
income.13
1
The Hardee court misinterpreted the Dean doctrine. The Dean
doctrine did not suggest that all interest-free loans "result in no taxa-
ble gain to the borrower."' 3 2 The court of appeals in Hardee inter-
preted the Dean doctrine more expansively than did the Tax Court
which announced the doctrine. The Tax Court required an interest
deduction under section 163 before holding that the borrower of an
interest-free loan has no taxable gain. 133 Logic suggests that courts
applying the Dean doctrine should defer to the Tax Court's interpre-
tation of its own doctrine. Moreover, the Hardee "income exemption"
analysis conflicts with the well-established judicial interpretation of
section 61 as a broad and sweeping inclusion provision.134 Thus, the
126 See, e.g., Sneed, supra note 96, at 652-57.
127 Id
128 See text accompanying notes 114-25 supra.
129 Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661, 664-67 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
130 I. at 665.
131 Id at 664-65. The Hardee court believed that the "wash-out" theory announced in
Dean was merely dicta in response to an IRS position, and not the basis of the Tax Court's
holding in Dean.
132 Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961); Hardee, 708 F.2d at 670-71
(Kashiwa, J., dissenting).
133 Dean, 35 T.C. at 1090, 1090-92 (Opper, J., concurring, and Bruce, J., dissenting);
Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 947-50 (1979), aj'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982).
134 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
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"income exemption" analysis does not represent the correct income
tax treatment of interest-free loans.
5. "Two-Payment Transaction" Analysis
In his dissenting opinion in Martin,135 Circuit Judge Goldberg
outlined the "two-payment transaction" analysis 36 which has been
codified in section 7872 of the Tax Reform Act.137 ' This analysis
equates the economic situation of an interest-free loan recipient to
that of a taxpayer who used additional compensation or dividends
from a corporation to pay interest on interest-bearing notes.' 38 Judge
Goldberg concluded that two taxpayers participating in economi-
cally identical transactions should incur similar tax liability.1
39
Under this analysis, an interest-free loan recipient must include
in gross income any economic benefit derived from the free use of the
borrowed money.14° However, the borrower may claim an interest
deduction equivalent to the amount included in gross income, if a
section 163 interest deduction would have been allowed had interest
actually been paid.' 4 ' Thus, two taxpayers in identical economic sit-
uations would receive the same tax treatment.
This analysis applies the "substance over form" doctrine consis-
tently to both the income and deduction aspects of interest-free
loans.i42 In addition, since an interest deduction is permitted only
when and if the deduction would otherwise be allowable, the first
and third flaws of the Dean doctrine are eliminated."43  Moreover,
including the economic benefits of an interest-free loan in gross in-
come also avoids the Dean doctrine's second flaw. 44Accordingly, un-
135 Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981).
136 The term "two-payment transaction" analysis is used to describe the economic reali-
ties of an interest-free loan. Such a loan is similar to a situation in which the borrower first
receives the payment of compensation or a dividend from the lender, and then makes an
interest payment of a comparable amount to the lender.
137 I.R.C. § 7872 (1984).
138 Martin, 649 F.2d at 1137, 1137-38 n.12.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1144 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); I.R.C. § 61(a) (1984). For the language of
§ 61(a), see note 100 supra.
141 649 F.2d at 1144-45 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); I.R.C. § 163(a) (1984). For the lan-
guage of § 163(a), see note 100 supra.
142 See text accompanying notes 100-13 supra (noting that the "substance over form" doc-
trine is not consistently applied to the income and deduction aspects of interest-free loans
under the "income/no deduction" analysis).
143 See text accompanying notes 116-18, 123-25 supra.
144 See text accompanying notes 119-22 supra.
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like the four analyses previously discussed, 145  the "two-payment
transaction" analysis effectively avoids all three of the Dean doctrine's
faults.
Before section 7872 was enacted, 146 two objections had been
raised to the implementation of the "two-payment transaction" anal-
ysis: (1) the lack of statutory authority for a deduction for interest
neither paid nor accrued; 147 and (2) the proper valuation method for
both the amount included in gross income and the interest deduc-
tion. 48 Section 7872 solves these two problems by creating a con-
structive interest payment 49 that is deductible under section 163 and
by establishing a valuation method. 50 Yet, neither problem ever
presented a major obstacle to applying the "two-payment transac-
tion" analysis.
First, section 163, the controlling statute, allows a deduction for
"all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebted-
ness." 5 Thus, section 163 does not literally permit an interest de-
duction for an interest-free loan. At first glance, this argument
appears insurmountable; however, this objection ignores the "quality
of rationality" doctrine. 152 This statutory interpretation doctrine re-
quires a court to apply the provisions of the tax code to achieve a
"quality of rationality" in every case. 53 Therefore, constructively
imputing income to the recipient of an interest-free loan and yet de-
nying a constructive interest payment deduction would violate the
"quality of rationality" doctrine.
Furthermore, allowing a deduction for constructive interest pay-
ments can be analogized to allocating a cost basis to property re-
ceived as compensation. 15 4 Section 163 should be applied flexibly to
145 See text accompanying notes 100-34 supra.
146 I.R.O. § 7872 (1984). Section 7872 applies to below-market loans made or outstanding
after June 6, 1984. See note 55 supra.
147 Hardee v. United States, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,658.
148 Martin, 649 F.2d at 1134.
149 See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
150 Id.
151 I.R.C. § 163(a) (1984). Section 163 literally allows a deduction only for interest that is
"paid or accrued." In the case of an interest-free loan, no interest has been "paid or accrued."
Therefore, no statutory authority under § 163 exists to permit an interest deduction for inter-
est-free loan transactions where interest has not been "paid or accrued." See Hardee, 82-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9459, at 84,658.
152 Martin, 649 F.2d at 1143 n.17 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion in
Martin stated that "[i]t is a court's duty to bestow upon the [tax] code's provisions 'a quality of
rationality'." Id
153 Id.
154 See I.R.C. § 83 (1984) (gross income includes property transferred in connection with
performance of services) and I.R.C. § 1012 (1984) (the basis of property is the cost of such
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interest-free loans to achieve a rational result. 155 Accordingly, to
achieve rationality in our tax law, a borrower receiving constructive
income from an interest-free loan should be allowed a constructive
interest deduction.
The second alleged problem with the two-payment transaction
analysis was the valuation of the economic benefit derived from an
interest-free loan. 156 The valuation problem centered upon deter-
mining "at what [interest] rate, and how, . . . the interest benefit
allowed [should] be calculated, for purposes of both gross income and
the counter-balancing deduction."' 57 The main difficulty was not
choosing the valuation method, but rather consistently applying the
chosen method to ensure "national uniformity in the application of
our tax laws."' 58 Legislative action was the best option to achieve
such uniformity in the tax system.159
Recently, Congress took legislative action and codified the "two-
payment transaction" analysis in section 7872.160 Section 7872 pro-
vides that a transfer and a retransfer are deemed to occur in a below-
market loan.161 By enacting section 7872, Congress has established
the "two-payment transaction" analysis as the method for the in-
come taxation of interest-free loans.
property), and the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder; Greenspun v. Commis-
sioner, 72 T.C. 931, 951 (1979), afd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982) (nterest-free loans as an
exception to the general rule of deductibility); Keller, The Tax Consequences ofInterest-Free Loans
From Corporations To Shareholders and From Employers to Employees, 19 B.C.L. REv. 231, 241
(1978). Under § 83, when property is received by an employee as compensation, generally
the excess of the fair market value of the property over the amount paid is includible in the
gross income of the employee. Under § 1012, the basis of property is the cost of such prop-
erty. Although the employee did not pay any monetary consideration for the property re-
ceived, he still incurred a "cost" in that he had to recognize income equal to the fair market
value of the property. The term "cost" does not literally apply to such a transaction. How-
ever, by slightly stretching its literal meaning, the "cost" of such property is considered to be
the amount that the employee must recognize as income.
155 See note 152 supra.
156 Martin, 659 F.2d at 1134.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 The two options available to effectuate the replacement of the Dean doctrine were: (1)
judicial interpretation; and (2) legislative enactment. The courts were reluctant, and right-
fully so, to alter the Dean doctrine because the judicial system cannot provide the necessary
national uniformity and certainty in the application of the tax laws. See text accompanying
notes 20-32 supra. Accordingly, the best option available to effectuate the implementation of
the "two-payment transaction" analysis was legislative enactment because it provides the nec-
essary national uniformity in the tax system.
160 I.R.C. § 7872 (1984).
161 Id.; see notes 53-93 supra and accompanying text.
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II. Gift Tax Consequences
A. Historical Perspective.- The Crown Doctrine
In Crown v. Commissioner,'62 a partnership, over several years,
made interest-free loans totaling eighteen million dollars to trusts es-
tablished for the partners' children and other close relatives. 163 The
IRS asserted that each partner of the partnership had made a taxa-
ble gift of the foregone interest on the outstanding loan balance for
each tax year.164 Accordingly, the IRS sent a notice of deficiency to
each partner.' 65 One of the partners, Lester Crown, filed suit attack-
ing the alleged deficiency. The Tax Court held that Crown "is not
subject to gift tax on his proportionate share of the partnership's out-
standing loans because the making of non-interest-bearing loans
under these circumstances is not a taxable event."'
66
The IRS appealed the Tax Court's ruling and proposed three
alternative theories to support its position. First, the IRS character-
ized the transaction at the time of the loan as an "unequal exchange"
under section 2512(b) 1 67  of the lender's property-the loan
money' 68-for the borrower's promise to repay the money upon de-
mand. 69 The IRS argued that such a promise to repay is less in
"money's worth" than the money loaned' 70 and that an "unequal
exchange" within the scope of section 2512(b) therefore occurred.1
7 '
Second, the IRS contended that the loan constituted an outright gift
of a property right: the right to use money for an indefinite pe-
riod.' 72 Third, instead of contending that a gift occurred at the time
of the loan, the IRS asserted that the lender made a continuous gift
during the time that he refrained from demanding repayment of the
162 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
163 Id. at 235. See Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), for complete factual
details. Although most of the money loaned in Crown was on open account (87%) and not
evidenced by any notes payable, this factual distinction is not relevant to the interest-free loan
analysis because the form of the transaction is outweighted by its interest-free substance.
164 Id. at 235.
165 Id
166 Crown, 67 T.C. at 1060.
167 585 F.2d at 238; I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1984) (a gift occurs when property is transferred for
less than adequate and full consideration).
168 H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 28, 30 (1932) (1939-1 C.B. 457, 478 (1939)); S.
REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 42 (1932) (1939-1 C.B. 496, 526 (1939)): "The word
'property' in the gift tax law includes money."
169 Crown, 585 F.2d at 238.
170 Id. Under the concept referred to as the "time-value of money," a promise to repay
money in the future is considered as being less in value than the money loaned.
171 Id.




To support these three theories, the IRS focused primarily on
sections 2512(b) and 2501 t74 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section
2512(b), the "unequal exchange" provision, states that a gift will be
deemed to have been made where any "property is transferred for
less than adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth. 1 7 5 In addition, section 2501 provides for a gift tax on any
"transfer of property by gift" during the taxable year.'7 6 Congress
intended section 2501 to "cover and comprehend all transactions
. . .whereby and to the extent. . . that property or a property right
is donatively passed to or conferred upon another, regardless of the
means or device employed in its accomplishment."' 77 The sweeping
purpose of section 2501 also indicates Congress' attempt to reach
every transfer of property by gift.17 8 Moreover, Congress adopted a
very broad definition of "property": "[t]he terms 'property,' 'trans-
fer,' 'gift,' and 'indirectly' are used in the broadest and most compre-
hensive sense; the term 'property' reaching every species of right or
interest protected by law and having an exchangeable value.11 79 Ac-
cordingly, the IRS reasoned that an interest-free demand loan was a
taxable transfer of property by gift. 80
Although sympathetic to the IRS' argument,'"" the Crozwn court
reasoned that the analysis underlying this position presented both
theoretical and practical difficulties.' 82 First, the court pointed out
the inconsistencies in the IRS' "unequal exchange" analysis. The
court stated that the economic value of an interest-free demand loan
at the time the loan was made is "both unknown and unknow-
able."t.83 Because the IRS did not establish that this type of loan was
173 Id. at 239-40.
174 Id. at 237; I.R.C. §§ 2512(b) and 2501 (1984).
175 I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1984).
176 I.R.C. § 2501 (1984).
177 H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st. Sess. 22 (1932) (1939-1 C.B. 457, 476 (1939)); S.
REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932) (1939-1 C.B. 496, 524 (1939)).
178 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1944); Robinette v. Helvering,
318 U.S. 184, 187 (1943); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1942). All these cases
stand for the general proposition that one of the purposes of the gift tax is to reach every kind
of transfer by gift, however conceptual or contingent, that is not an ordinary business
transaction.
179 H.R. REP. No. 708, supra note 177, at 27; S. REP. No. 665, supra note 177, at 39.
180 Crown, 585 F.2d at 234-38; I.R.C. § 2501 (1984).
181 585 F.2d at 241. The court stated that judicial construction was not the proper avenue
by which to fill the alleged significant loophole in the gift tax statute created by interest-free
loans. The court felt that its hands were tied, and expressed its sympathy to the IRS.
182 Id. at 238.
183 Id.
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uniformly traded at less than face value, the court refused to hold
that an "unequal exchange" took place at the time of the loan.184
In addition, the court found that the IRS' proposed method for
determining the timing and amount of the taxable gift arising from
the loan conflicted with the "unequal exchange" theory. The IRS
would have assessed the amount of the gift by applying the market
interest rate to the outstanding loan balance in any calendar quarter
of the tax year, not at the time of the loan.18 5 This valuation method
could have caused a taxpayer with a continuously outstanding loan
to pay more gift tax than if the money had been transferred out-
right. 186 For all of these reasons, the court concluded that the "une-
qual exchange" theory was not the proper approach.187
After analyzing the IRS' second and third arguments, the court
found no evidence that an interest-free loan borrower received a le-
gally protectible interest with an ascertainable exchange value.
188
Therefore, the loan recipient's right to use the loan money indefi-
nitely was not characterized as "property" or a "property right"
within the meaning of section 2501.189 The court noted that to hold
otherwise would broaden the concept of "property" or "property
right" beyond Congress' intended scope.' 90 Moreover, to further for-
tify its conclusion, the court quoted the Tax Court:
"[O]ur income tax system does not recognize unrealized earnings
or accumulations of wealth and no taxpayer is under any obliga-
tion to continuously invest his money for a profit. The opportu-
nity cost of either letting one's money remain idle or suffering a
loss from an unwise investment is not taxable merely because a
profit could have been made from a wise investment."''9
184 Id at 238, 240. The Tax Court acknowledged that interest-free term loans are not the
same as interest-free demand loans in that only the former gives rise to gift tax consequences
under the "unequal exchange" theory of I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1984). See Johnson v. United
States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953).
185 585 F.2d at 238-39. In the Tax Court, the IRS proposed to value the gift by multiply-
ing any outstanding balance in any calendar quarter by a market rate of interest. See Crown
v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
186 585 F.2d at 239. For example, if a parent gives $100,000 to his child, the parent's gift
tax liability is approximately $23,800. However, if a parent loans his child $100,000 interest-
free for 20 years, the parent's gift tax liability would be approximately $36,000 ($100,000 x
10% of assumed imputed interest x 20 years x gift tax rate). Both cases ignore any effects of
the unified credit of § 2505 and the annual exclusion of § 2503(b).
187 Id
188 Id
189 Id; see text accompanying note 179 supra.
190 585 F.2d at 240.




While mentioning other problems with the IRS' position,192 the
Crown court in essence reasoned that imposing a gift tax on interest-
free demand loans would tax what a taxpayer could have done with
his money rather than what he actually did. 93 Therefore, the court
refused to impose a gift tax on the lender of interest-free demand
notes. 1
94
B. Recent Analysis. Dickman v. Commissioner
1. Court of Appeals Decision
In Dickman v. Commissioner,'95 the taxpayers made interest-free
demand loans to their son and to a closely-held corporation that the
taxpayers and the son owned.' 96 As in Crown,19 7 the IRS asserted
that the lenders had made a taxable gift of the interest foregone on
the outstanding loan balance during the tax year. 98 Accordingly,
the taxpayers were sent statutory notices of gift tax deficiencies.' 99
The Tax Court followed the Crown decision and held that the tax-
payers did not incur gift tax liability on the loans.200 The IRS ap-
pealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the Tax Court's ruling.
Having analyzed the applicable sections of the Internal Reve-
nue Code,20' the Dickman appeals court determined that the lender of
192 Id. at 240-41. The court noted the following three problems. First, since no statute or
regulation contained standards to determine a reasonable imputed interest rate, a court
would have no guidelines to follow to establish the interest rate. Second, the IRS' position
could include transactions that the court felt should not be subject to the gift tax statute (i.e.,
borrowing your neighbor's lawnmower, or lending a child tuition fees). Finally, the court
stated that equitable considerations supported its decision. The IRS had only recently as-
serted that the gift tax statute applied to interest-free loans. Moreover, the IRS did not ap-
peal or immediately nonacquiesce in the unfavorable decision of Johnson v. United States,
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), the only case on all fours with Crown.
193 Id. at 240.
194 585 F.2d at 241.
195 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982).
196 Id. at 813-14 n.2.
197 Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); see 1978-2 C.B. 3 (1978) (IRS'
"nonacquiescence" in the Crown decision).
198 Dickrnan, 690 F.2d at 814.
199 Id.
200 Id at 813.
201 Id at 814-16; I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1984) (a tax is imposed on the transfer of property
by gift); I.R.C. § 2511 (a) (1984) (gift tax applies whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise,
direct or indirect, and whether property is real or personal, tangible or intangible) and I.R.C.
§ 2512(a)(b) (1984) (the value of the property at the date of the gift is the amount of the gift;
and if property is transferred for less than full and adequate consideration, the excess of the
property value over the consideration paid is deemed a gift).
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an interest-free demand loan essentially gives the borrower a right to
use property-money-indefinitely. 2 2 Courts previously have held
that this right itself constitutes "property" and may be the subject of
a taxable gift.20 3 The Dickman appeals court acknowledged that in
the case before it, the lenders had retained dominion and control of
the property, but observed that this fact alone did not prevent a tax-
able gift.20 4 The court cited Treasury Regulation 25.2511-2() 20 5:
[I]n the case of a transfer of property which is an incomplete gift
because the donor retains dominion and control, the "receipt of
income or other enjoyment of the transferred property by the
transferee" during the period before the gift is complete "consti-
tutes a gift of such income or other such enjoyment taxable as of
the calendar quarter . . . of its receipt.)
20 6
In conclusion, the court of appeals held that a lender incurs gift tax
liability for the value of the borrower's beneficial use of the money
loaned when he makes a gratuitous interest-free loan.
20 7
2. Supreme Court Decision
In a 7-2 decision °2 0 8 the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court ruling and held that "interest-free demand loans . . . resulted
in taxable gifts of the reasonable value of the use of the money
lent."209 After reviewing the language and the legislative histories of
sections 2501(a)(1) and 2511(a), the Court determined that "[t]he
language of these statutes is clear and admits of but one reasonable
interpretation: transfers of property by gift, by whatever means ef-
fected, are subject to the federal gift tax."1210 The Court also rea-
soned that "Congress intended the gift tax statute to reach all
202 690 F.2d at 814-16; see note 168 supra.
203 690 F.2d at 815; see Abbott v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,040 (S.D.
Miss. 1974) (gift tax valuation for the right to use property during the life of another);
Thriftmart, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 598, 615-16 (1963) (charitable deduction and lease
terminable by owner upon sale of premises); Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682,
686 (M.D. Ga. 1963) (charitable deduction for right to use real estate for such time as the
owner permits); Sullivan v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 228, 231 (1951) (charitable deduction for
right to use property for duration of war); Rev. Rul. 63-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408 (1973) (right to
use property for an indefinite period, terminable at will by the owner, is property).
204 690 F.2d at 815.
205 Id. at 815-16; Treas. Reg. 25.2511-2() (1981).
206 690 F.2d at 815-16.
207 Id. at 819-20. The court rested its decision not only on Treas. Reg. 25.2511-2(), but
also on the gift tax statute, the statute's legislative history, judicial interpretation, and the
policy considerations underlying the statute.
208 Dickman v. Commissioner, 104 S. Ct. 1086, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1932 (1984).
209 Id. at 1094-95.
210 Id. at 1089.
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gratuitous transfers of any valuable interest in property."'21'
Next, the Court analyzed the interest-free loan transaction to
determine whether the gratuitous transfer of the right to use money
was a "transfer of property" under section 2501 (a) (1). The legislative
history of the gift tax statute was said to reflect Congress' intention
that section 2501(a) "encompass all transfers of property and prop-
erty rights having significant value." 212 The Court noted that it pre-
viously had stated that the gift tax statute was sufficiently broad to
reach every transfer of "property, however conceptual or
contingent.1
213
Moreover, the Court analogized a tenancy at will as an interest
in real property to the use of money as an interest in personal prop-
erty.214 The recipient of either property right does not acquire the
legal title to the underlying property. Instead the transferee receives
only the beneficial title: the right to use and control the underlying
property to the exclusion of all others, subject only to the interest
retained by the legal owner.215 Since the right to use the underlying
property is the most essential element of property,216 the Court thus
had "little difficulty accepting the theory that the use of valuable
property-in this case money-is itself a legally protectible property
interest., 21
7
Attempting to strengthen its rationale, the Court observed that
its holding protected the income and estate tax systems and thereby
achieved one of the major purposes of the gift tax.218 In addition, the
Court refuted each of the taxpayer's major arguments against impo-
sition of the gift tax.
21 9
211 Id.
212 Id. at 1089-90 (emphasis in original).
213 Id. at 1090 (quoting Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1943)); see also Robi-
nette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 187 (1943). Both cases stated that the gift tax statute should
be interpreted broadly to carry out the clear and obvious intent of Congress.
214 Id. at 1090-91.
215 Id. at 1091.
216 Id. The Dickman Court quoted the definition of "property" in Passailaique v. United
States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963): "Property is composed of constituent ele-
ments and of these elements the right to use the physical thing to the exclusion of others is the
most essential and beneficial" (emphasis in original).
217 Id at 1090. The Court noted that the demand status of the loan may reduce, but will
not eliminate, the value of the transferred benefit in that a demand loan has little exchange-
able value that a transferee of the borrower would pay the borrower for. Id at 1091.
218 Id. at 1091-92. The imposition of gift tax on interest-free loan transactions minimizes
the use ofsuch loans to shift income from high tax bracket taxpayers to low tax bracket ones
and thus protects the income tax. In addition, it prevents the diminution of the transferors
estate so as to avoid estate tax.
219 Id at 1092-94. The taxpayer made three arguments against imposition of the gift tax.
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The two dissenting Justices believed that the majority's holding
was "ill-advised and inequitable." 220 According to the dissent, the
Court should not have overruled the long-standing rule for gift taxa-
tion of interest-free loans. Instead, it should have deferred to Con-
gress, the forum best able to resolve such complex and far-reaching
policy issues as the gift taxation of interest-free loans.
221
Although the Court held that interest-free demand loans are
subject to gift tax, it did not determine the method of timing and of
valuation of such gifts. 222 The Court stated that the IRS "need not
establish that the funds loaned did in fact produce a particular
amount of revenue; it is sufficient for the Commissioner to establish
that a certain yield could readily be secured and that the reasonable
value of the use of the funds can be reliably ascertained.
'223
Relying on this language, the IRS issued a news release224 that
established the valuation formula for a gift created by an interest-free
demand loan made before January 1, 1984.225 In the news release,
First, the taxpayer asserted that to impose gift tax on interest-free loans essentially imposed a
tax on unrealized earnings. The lender had no duty to invest the loan proceeds for profit;
however, if the lender did not invest the proceeds the IRS would impose a gift tax on the
lender. Second, the taxpayer contended that the IRS would have potentially broad discre-
tion to impose a gift tax on de minimis loan transactions. Finally, the taxpayers urged that to
impose a gift tax in this situation would contradict the IRS' former practice and prevent
taxpayers from relying on prior case law even though the IRS did not challenge the unfavora-
ble law.
As to the taxpayers' first argument, the Court stated that it would impose gift tax on the
transfer and not on what the borrower may do with the loan proceeds after the gift occurred.
Id. at 1092. Concerning the second argument, the Court assumed that the IRS would exercise
its discretion reasonably and not focus on traditional familial or de minimis matters. Id at
1093. Finally, the Court rejected the taxpayers' detrimental reliance argument because it is
well established that the IRS can change its prior interpretation of the law, even retroactively.
Id. at 1093-94; see Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-75 (1965); Automobile Club of
Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1957) (both establishing that the IRS can
change its interpretation of the tax law and apply its ruling retroactively).
220 104 S. Ct. at 1099 (Powell and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices
believed that the majority was wrong to reject a longstanding principle of tax law and to
create a new and anomalous rule of tax law.
221 Id at 1097-99 (Powell and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting); see I.R.C. § 7872 (1984) (Treat-
ment of Loans with Below-Market Interest Rates) and text accompanying notes 227-38 infra.
222 Id. at 1095 n. 14. The Court did not determine the method of timing and valuation of
interest-free gift loans because these questions were not addressed in the record. The court of
appeals had declined to address the question and had remanded to the Tax Court for
consideration.
223 Id
224 1984-15 I.R.B. 19 (5-11-84).
225 In this news release, the IRS announced that the donors of gifts created by interest-free
demand loans made before January 1, 1984, must compute the value of the gifts by multiply-
ing the average outstanding loan balance for that calendar quarter by the lesser of either the
statutory interest rate for refunds and deficiencies or the annual average rate for three-month
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the IRS not only established the valuation method for pre-1984 gifts
in interest-free demand loan transactions, but it also announced sev-
eral administrative exemptions from gift tax. 226 Although the news
release does not apply to interest-free demand loan gifts occurring on
or after January 1, 1984, the rules probably will be extended to cover
the period from January 1, 1984 to the effective date of section
7872.227
Treasury bills. Id. For pre-1984 gifts, the applicable interest rates for years as far back as













The applicable interest rates for all years before 1960 are the annual average rates for three-
month Treasury bills in that the above-described statutory interest rates are greater than such
Treasury bill rates. Id.
226 Id. No gift tax return must be filed either if the average annual outstanding interest-
free demand loan balance did not exceed $50,000 per year for each donee ($100,000 if made
by married couples), or if the amount of the gift calculated pursuant to the news release was
less than the annual exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1984) for the year in question. The
present interest exclusion under § 2503(b) was $3,000 from the years 1971 through 1981, and
$10,000 thereafter.
Examples: (1) During 1983, a married couple could have interest-free demand loans
outstanding in the amount of $232,558 per donee and be exempt -from the gift tax filing
requirements. This result is reached because the amount of the gift calculated pursuant to
the news release does not exceed the $10,000 annual exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1984)
when the split-gift election of I.R.C. § 2513 (1984) is timely made. ($232,558 / 2 x 8.6% =
$9,999.999).
(2) During 1978, a married couple could have such loans outstanding in the amount of
$98,360 per donee and avoid the reporting requirement under the news release. ($98,360 / 2
X 6.1% = $2,999.98). The annual exclusion under I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1984) of $3,000 was not
exceeded along with the loan balance being less than $100,000. Thus, no gift tax return need
be filed.
In addition, if the only reason a married couple would file a gift tax return for pre-1984
gifts related to an interest-free demand loan is to elect the split-gift provision of I.R.C. § 2513
(1984), then no gift tax return must be filed for such gifts. Moreover, pre-1984 interest-free
demand loan gifts that are not in excess of the above administrative reporting exceptions are
disregarded for purposes of calculating the estate tax and gift tax even though the donor
made other gifts to the same donee during the same tax year.
227 The IRS plans to publish a revenue ruling to incorporate the language contained in
1984-15 I.R.B. 19 (5-11-84) and a table for valuing interest-free demand loans outstanding
before 1960.
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C. Tax Reform Act of 1984. Caveat Creditor
Under section 7872, below-market gift loans incur gift tax, un-
less specifically exempted.2 28 Thus, section 7872 essentially codifies
the Dickman decision and imposes gift tax consequences on below-
market loans.229 The type of loan involved determines the amount
subject to gift taxation. 2
30
The lender of a below-market gift demand loan is deemed to
have made a gift on the last day of the calendar year to the borrower
of any interest foregone during the year.23 1 The amount of foregone
interest treated as a gift equals the amount of imputed interest recog-
nized by the lender as income under the income tax provisions of
section 7872 previously discussed.2 32
With a below-market gift term loan, the lender is deemed to
have given the borrower the excess of the amount loaned over the
present value of all payments required under the loan agreement.233
The gift occurs on the date the loan is made.2 34 The amount of the
gift equals the amount that the lender recognizes as original issue
discount under the income tax rules of section 7872 previously
discussed. 23
5
Interest-free loans are subject to gift taxation unless either the
$10,000 de minimis exception 236 or the "IRS regulations" excep-
228 I.R.C. §§ 7872(a) and (b) (establishing gift tax liability); and (c)(2) and (g)(1)(c)
(1984) (exempting certain transactions). Section 7872 establishes a transfer of property which
may be a gift subject to tax under § 2501.
229 Dickman v. Commissioner, 104 S. Ct. 1086, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1932 (1984), estab-
lished gift tax liability for interest-free demand loans only.
230 I.R.C. §§ 7872(a) (demand loans: see text accompanying notes 230-31 in/fa), (b), and
(d)(2) (1984) (term loans: see text accompanying notes 232-33 infia).
231 Id. at §§ (a)(1) and (2). For example, a single parent loans his child $250,000 on a
demand basis at a rate of five per cent per annum. Donative intent is assumed. For 1984, the
parent must report a gift subject to the gift tax statute if the gift exceeds the annual exclusion
under I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1984). Here, the gift is approximately $6,284, which is not in excess
of such annual exclusion. Thus, no gift tax is imposed. In addition, the parents must recog-
nize imputed interest income of the same $6,284, as well as the actual interest received from
the child. The child may be entitled to an interest deduction for the imputed and actual
interest paid to the extent allowable. This example illustrates that § 7872 integrates the in-
come and gift tax consequences arising from any below-market gift loan. See example at note
67 supra explaining the income tax consequences.
232 Id.; see also text accompanying notes 60-69 supra.
233 I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1)(A) and (B) (1984).
234 Id. at § (b)(1). If§ 7872 does not apply when the loan is made, then the gift is deemed
to occur on the first day that § 7872 does apply.
235 Id. at §§ (b)(1) and (2); see also text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
236 I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2) (1984). For a discussion of the $10,000 de minimis exception, see
text accompanying notes 79-84 supra.
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tion237 applies. Section 7872 does not apply to a gift loan between
individuals with a total outstanding loan balance less than $10,000,
unless the loan proceeds are Used directly to purchase or carry in-
come-producing assets.238 In addition, the IRS can enact regulations
that exempt certain transactions from section 7872 if the transactions
do not significantly affect the tax liability of either the lender or the
borrower.
239
D. Suggested Analysis." Gift Taxation of Interest-Free Loans
Although the factual situations differed, both Dickman2 ° and
Crown24' addressed the basic issue of whether taxable gifts resulted
from interest-free demand loans to the lender's relatives.242 The
Crown court held that no taxable gift resulted from the transaction at
issue. 243 The Dickman Court, however, rejected both the reasoning
and result of Crown and held that there was a taxable gift. 244 An
analysis of the major arguments supporting the imposition of the gift
tax to interest-free loan transactions reveals that the application of
the "continuous gift" theory,2 45 now codified in section 7872, pro-
duces the proper result.
In its effort to apply the gift tax statute to interest-free demand
loans, the IRS advanced three theories: (1) the "unequal exchange"
theory;246 (2) the "outright gift of a property right" theory;247 and (3)
the "continuous gift" theory.2 48 None of these theories conforms to a
literal construction of the gift tax statute.249 Under a broader statu-
tory interpretation, however, the application of the gift tax statute to
interest-free demand loans under the "continuous gift" theory would
be consistent with the IRS' proposal for timing and valuing gifts.250
237 I.R.C. § 7 872(g) (1) (C) (1984). For a discussion of the "IRS regulations" exception, see
text accompanying note 92 supra.
238 I.R.C. § (c)(2)(A) and (B) (1984).
239 Id at § (g)(1)(C).
240 Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812, 813-14 (11th Cir. 1982), afd, 104 S. Ct.
1086, reh g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1932 (1984).
241 Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1978).
242 Id. at 234-35; Dicknan, 690 F.2d at 813.
243 Crown, 585 F.2d at 241.
244 Dickman, 690 F.2d at 818-20.
245 See notes 261-82 infia and accompanying text.
246 Crown, 585 F.2d at 238.
247 Id. at 239.
248 Id. at 239-40.
249 Id. at 238-40. See text accompanying notes 251-90 infra for an explanation of why
these theories are not appropriate if the gift tax statute is interpreted literally and technically.
250 See text accompanying notes 262-93 inra.
1984]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
1. "Unequal Exchange" Theory of Section 2512(b)
Although the "unequal exchange" theory has been applied to
below-market term loans,25' this theory is not appropriate for inter-
est-free demand loans. 252 The IRS' application of this theory to in-
terest-free demand loans253 was theoretically creative, but not
persuasive. The "unequal exchange" theory focuses on the bor-
rower's promise of repayment made at the time of the loan. The IRS
considered a promise to repay less in "money's worth" than the
money loaned 254 and therefore argued that the loan transaction con-
stituted an unequal exchange.
In Crown, the court correctly rejected this theory as impractical
because at the time of the loan the value of the promise to repay
cannot be ascertained. Thus, when the loan is made the transfer of
any economic benefits is incomplete and cannot be subject to gift
tax. 255 Moreover, the "unequal exchange" theory conflicts with the
IRS' method for timing and valuation of the gift arising from the
loan.
256
2. "Outright Gift of Property Right" Theory
The IRS alternatively has characterized the interest-free loan as
an outright gift at the time of the loan. The IRS has argued that the
borrower's right to use the lender's money indefinitely constitutes a
"property right" under the gift tax statute.257 The technical and lit-
eral meaning of the terms "property" and "property rights" includes
rights or interests "protected by law and having an exchangeable
value.'"258
The Dickman Court held that the transfer of the right to use
money has an exchangeable value, is a legally protected interest, and
251 See Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204 (1953); Berkman v. Commissioner, 387
TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 183 (1979). Both cases held that the difference between the fair
market value of the property conveyed or money loaned and the fair market value of the note
received in exchange constituted a gift.
252 Crown, 585 F.2d at 239; see text accompanying notes 181-87 supra.
253 Commissioner's Brief at 20-21, 36-37, Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812 (11th
Cir. 1982).
254 Id
255 Id.; Crown, 585 F.2d at 238.
256 Id. The "unequal exchange" theory measures the gift at the time the loan was made.
However, the IRS proposed measuring the gift as occurring in subsequent periods as long as
the loan is outstanding.
257 Commissioner's Brief at 17, 34, Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir.
1982); see also Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (detached and disinter-
ested generosity necessary for finding of a gift).
258 See text accompanying notes 179, 188-90 supra.
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therefore constitutes "property" within the meaning of section
2501.259 But the Court did not hold that the transfer of the right to
use money through an interest-free demand loan was an outright gift
of "property" or of a "property right" subject to gift tax. 260 As with
the "unequal exchange" theory, the "outright gift of property right"
theory measures the gift at the time of the loan; therefore this theory
cannot be applied consistently with the IRS' methods of timing and
valuation.
261
3. "Continuous Gift" Theory
The "continuous gift" theory of interest-free demand loans, now
codified in section 7872, establishes that the gift continuously occurs
during the period that the loan is outstanding.262 The "continuous
gift" theory provides the proper analysis for imposing a gift tax on
interest-free demand loans. Since the amount of the gift depends on
the period the loan remains outstanding,263 this theory is consistent
with the timing and valuation methods originally proposed by the
IRS264 and now codified in section 7872.265
Until Dickman, though, the courts were confronted with a con-
ceptual problem: "[t]o characterize the mere use of property as a
transfer of a property right implies a broader concept of what consti-
tutes a property right under the gift tax laws than has heretofore
been recognized. '266 Moreover, the IRS, in a different context, had
construed the terms "property" and "property right" technically.
The IRS had previously concluded that the revocable transfer of the
mere use of property is not a "legally enforceable conveyance" and
does not constitute a gift of "property" or a "property right.
'267
Nevertheless, the IRS argued the "continuous gift" theory in
259 Dickman v. Commissioner, 104 S. Ct. 1086, 1090-91 (1984).
260 Dickman, 104 S. Ct. at 1090-91 and n.14.
261 Crown, 585 F.2d at 238.
262 Id. at 239-40.
263 See note 264 infra.
264 585 F.2d at 239-40; Solicitor General's Brief at 9, Dickman, 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984).
Under the "continuous gift" theory, the gift is measured by multiplying the outstanding bal-
ance of the loan at the end of each calendar quarter by a market rate of interest.
265 I.R.C. § 7872 (1984).
266 Crown, 585 F.2d at 240 (footnote omitted).
267 Se'text accompanying notes 168, 179, and 188-90 supra for an explanation of the term
"property." Although the IRS was not ruling on a gift tax issue in I.T. 3918, 1948-2 C.B. 33
(1948) and Rev. Rul. 70-477, 1970-2 C.B. 62 (1970), the IRS asserted that a donation of the
use of property that is revocable at the donor's will does not constitute a gift of "property"
within the meaning of the charitable contribution provisions of I.R.C. § 170 (1984), as op-
posed to the gift tax statute.
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Dickman, and the Supreme Court accepted the argument.2 68 The
Dickman Court concluded that the transfer of the mere use of prop-
erty was a "transfer of property" subject to the gift tax statute.269 In
addition, in his concurring opinion in the Dickman appellate court
decision, Circuit Judge Fay presented the most persuasive argument
for the gift taxation of interest-free demand loans:
Taxpayers have given away no property, no interests and no
rights but surely they have made a gift. . . . When one lets an-
other use large sums of money for no charge, who would doubt
that there has been conferred a valuable gift? The fact that the
receipt given for the money is a demand note makes no difference
Feeling that courts should avoid "slavish" interpretation of
the [Internal Revenue] Code and that the taxpayers in this in-
stance are the ones relying on a "crabbed reading" of the words
used by Congress, I join with Judge Hill [and hold that gratui-
tous interest-free loans do have gift tax consequences]. Any other
result makes no sense.2 7 0
The "substance over form" and the "quality of rationality" doc-
trines implicitly underlie Judge Fay's reasoning.271 By using an in-
terest-free demand loan, a taxpayer attempts to avoid a gift tax on
the transfer of an economic benefit.272 Under the "substance over
form" doctrine, the substance of the transaction determines the tax
treatment.27 3 Applying the "substance over form" doctrine to an in-
terest-free demand loan identifies the valuable economic benefit con-
ferred upon the recipient.
274
Normally, the transfer of a valuable economic benefit is subject
to gift taxation.2 75 Nevertheless, until Dickman and the enactment of
section 7872, taxpayers successfully applied the gift tax statute liter-
ally and thus avoided gift taxation.276 Before the enactment of sec-
268 See note 264 supr, see also Dicman, 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984).
269 Dickman, 104 S. Ct. at 1090-91.
270 Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812, 820 (1lth Cir. 1982) (Fay, J., concurring).
271 See text accompanying notes 109-13 ("substance over form" doctrine) and 152-55
("quality of rationality" doctrine). Although the court did not explicitly mention these doc-
trines, the court's decision and its underlying rationale indicate that the court relied on the
"substance over form" and "quality of rationality" doctrines.
272 See Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. United States,
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
273 See text accompanying notes 109-13 supra.
274 The borrower of an interest-free demand loan receives the opportunity to make money
at no cost. See note 45 supra.
275 I.R.C. § 2501 (1984) (a tax is imposed on the transfer of property by gift).
276 See Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. United States,
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
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tion 7872, even applying the "substance over form" doctrine would
not alone have warranted gift taxation of interest-free demand loans.
Yet, the "quality of rationality" doctrine also would have de-
manded that the lender of a gratuitous interest-free demand loan pay
gift tax. This doctrine would have prevented the IRS from imputing
interest income to the lender while simultaneously denying a con-
structive interest deduction to the borrower of an interest-free
loan.277 The "quality of rationality" doctrine is a double-edged
sword that requires a court to interpret and apply gift tax provisions
rationally.278 In Dickman, the Supreme Court held that interest-free
loan transactions are "transfers of property" within the broad mean-
ing of the gift tax statute.279 While claiming only "to effectuate Con-
gress' intent," the Court actually expanded its interpretation of the
gift tax statute to achieve a quality of rationality.280
Moreover, judicial interpretation and the legislative history of
the gift tax statute support the Dickman decision. These sources indi-
cate that "gift" is to be interpreted in the "broadest and most com-
prehensive sense" regardless of the means or device used to make the
taxable gift.281 This definition of "gift" supports the expansion of
gift taxation to interest-free demand loans. In conclusion, even with-
out the gift tax consequences recently created by section 7872, under
an expanded concept of "property" or "property right," the gratui-
tous transfer of the right to use money interest-free indefinitely is a
"transfer of property" under section 2501.282
Section 7872 subjects interest-free demand loans to gift taxation;
however, the proper method of timing and valuation of these gifts
must still be established. Under section 7872, the gift arising from an
interest-free demand loan is deemed transferred as of the last day of
the calendar year and is measured by totaling the daily foregone in-
terest for the year.28 3 A Treasury Department regulation 28 4 provides
for recognition of a gift of beneficial enjoyment of transferred prop-
277 See text accompanying notes 152-55 supra.
278 Dickman, 104 S. Ct. at 1094-95.
279 Id. at 1094.
280 See text accompanying notes 152-55 supra.
281 Crown, 585 F.2d at 238; see text accompanying notes 174-80 supra.
282 See text accompanying notes 269-81 supra.
283 I.R.C. § 7872(a) (1984).
284 Treas. Reg. 25.2511-2(o (1981) provides that in the case of a transfer of property that
is an incomplete gift because the donor retains dominion and control, the receipt of income or
other enjoyment of the transferred property during the period before the gift is complete
"constitutes a gift of such income or of such other enjoyment taxable as of the calendar 'pe-
riod' . . . of its receipt."
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erty in the calendar quarter of its receipt. Section 7872, however,
postpones recognition of the gift until the end of the year.
285
Section 7872's gift valuation method creates theoretical and
practical hurdles that are not present with the section's timing
rule.286 Section 7872 provides that the gift will be valued at the fed-
eral short-term rate for interest-free demand loans. 287 This statutory
interest rate is a fair and favorable rate because most taxpayers
would have a higher interest rate on an ordinary loan.
288
Nevertheless, taxpayers would argue that this arbitrary rate of
interest would not reflect the variations possible with interest-free
loan transactions. For example, what happens if the recipient of an
interest-free demand loan does not invest the money loaned? And
what will be the tax consequences if such a loan is continuously out-
standing for many years even if the recipient does invest the money
loaned? In both situations, the valuation method under section 7872
would lead to an unjust result. In the first situation, the taxpayer
would be taxed on what the recipient could or should have earned
from the loan, and not what he actually earned. 28 9 In the second
situation, a taxpayer could pay more in gift taxes than he would have
had he made an outright gift of the amount loaned.
29°
To ensure a just application of the tax laws, Congress must es-
tablish a valuation standard that will avoid these two potential injus-
tices. The following proposal exemplifies such a uniform standard.
For interest-free demand loans, the gift should be deemed to occur on
each day with outstanding interest-free loans and should be mea-
sured as provided under section 7872. But, if the taxpayer proved
that the assigned value of the benefit transferred exceeds the benefit's
actual value, then only the gift's actual value should be taxed. Fur-
285 I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2) (1984).
286 See text accompanying notes 287-90 infia. Even though I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1984) allows
an annual $1 0,000 exclusion that eliminates the possibility of gift taxation of de minimis gifts,
the method of valuation chosen must be fundamentally fair so that the donor is taxed only on
the fair and reasonable value of the benefit transferred.
287 I.R.C. § 7872(0(2)(B) (1984). The interest rates used in Dickman were the same as
those established under I.R.C. § 6621 (1984), as made applicable by I.R.C. § 6601 (1984) to
underpayments in tax. Dickman, 690 F.2d at 814 n.4. In Crown, however, the IRS proposed
the use of an interest rate equal to the market rate of interest charged on similar loans. Crown,
585 F.2d at 235. The IRS has not asserted any specified interest rate consistently and has
thus generated valuation problems of great magnitude. See Dickman, 104 S. Ct. at 1097-98
(Powell and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting).
288 Commissioner's Brief at 21 n.18, Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir.
1982).
289 Crown, 585 F.2d at 240.
290 Id. at 239. For examples, see note 186 supra.
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thermore, if the taxpayer established that the gift taxes assessed ex-
ceed the tax he would have paid for an outright gift, then the gift tax
due should be limited to the tax for an outright gift. Essentially, this
proposal modifies section 7872's valuation method to avoid the two
injustices potentially arising from a strict application of section 7872.
III. Conclusion
The courts and Congress have recognized that an interest-free
demand loan is economically equivalent to a two-payment transac-
tion involving an interest-bearing loan and an increase in dividend or
compensation comparable to the interest payment. Under the Dean
doctrine, the courts attempted to impose similar income tax conse-
quences on these economically identical transactions. The applica-
tion of the Dean doctrine, however, did not achieve its intended
result. The "two-payment" transaction theory is the only method
that properly imposes income tax on interest-free loans. This theory
eliminates the Dean doctrine's flaws and provides comparable inter-
est-free tax treatment to taxpayers participating in economically
identical transactions, such as an interest-free loan and a two-pay-
ment transaction.
Under the Dean doctrine, interest-free demand loans outstand-
ing prior to June 7, 1984, are not subject to income taxation.291 In
addition, such loans outstanding on June 6, 1984, and repaid before
September 17, 1984, are exempt from income tax under section
7872.292 However, all interest-free demand loans outstanding on
June 6, 1984, and not repaid before September 17, 1984, are subject
to the rules of section 7872 establishing income tax consequences.
Until recently, a gratuitous interest-free demand loan was not
considered an event subject to gift taxation. Now, a gratuitous inter-
est-free demand loan results in the imposition of gift tax under both
291 See cases cited at note 2 supra; see also Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir.
1983). Although the Dean doctrine is considered to be the controlling law, the IRS now has
strong support to seek imposition of the income tax statute to taxpayers using interest-free
loan transactions in the geographic locations covered by the six remaining circuits. The ra-
tionale of the Supreme Court underlying Dickman applies to all interest-free loan transactions.
It is unlikely that the IRS would pursue such a course of action, but if the IRS did so, and a
conflict among the circuits developed, the Court could alter Dean and apply its decision retro-
actively. Such a result would be as disastrousto taxpayers as the Dickman decision was.
292 On Aug. 28, 1984, the IRS explained in news release IR-84-95 that a loan is considered
to be "repaid" within the meaning of § 7872 if the loan is repaid, forgiven, cancelled, or
otherwise retired, or if the interest rate of the loan is changed in any way, before Sept. 17,
1984. This special exception does not alter the gift tax consequences under Dick'nan applica-
ble to loans outstanding before the effective date of § 7872.
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the Dickman decision and the Tax Reform Act.293 The Dickman hold-
ing applies to all gratuitous interest-free demand loans outstanding
prior to June 7, 1984, or to such loans outstanding on June 6, 1984,
that are repaid before September 17, 1984. The Dickman holding was
cQdified in section 7872, which encompasses not only interest-free de-
mand loans specifically covered in Dickman, but also all below-market
loans, whether demand, term, gift, non-gift, or any combination of
these. Now, under section 7872, a below-market or an interest-free
loan will have significant income or gift tax consequences, or both,
unless one of the enumerated statutory exceptions applies.
293 Although § 7872 may apply, § 2503(b) allows an individual to give up to $10,000
annually to each donee before incurring any gift tax liability. In addition, a married couple
may give each beneficiary up to $20,000 annually before incurring any gift tax liability under
the split-gift provision of§ 2513. Moreover, even if the annual exclusion is exceeded, no gift
tax liability will result until the § 2505 unified credit has been exhausted.
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